Preferences for European unemployment insurance: a question of economic ideology or EU support?


Download fulltext

a368

Journal of European Public Policy ISSN: 1350-1763 (Print) 1466-4429 (Online) homepage: https://www tandfonline com/loi/rjpp20 Preferences for unemployment insurance: a question economic ideology or EU support? Theresa Kuhn Francesco Nicoli & Frank Vandenbroucke To cite this article: (2020) 27:2 208-226 DOI: 10 1080/13501763 2019 1701529 link to https://doi org/10 © 2020 The Author(s) Published by Informa UK Limited trading as Taylor Francis Group View supplementary material online: 30 Jan Submit your article journal Article views: 146 related articles Crossmark data Full Terms Conditions access and use can be found at com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpp20 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY VOL 27 NO 2 208–226 Nicolib Vandenbrouckec aDepartment Political Science University Amsterdam Netherlands; bDepartment Governance Management Gent Belgium; cAmsterdam Institute Social Research (AISSR) Netherlands KEYWORDS insurance; social policy; left-right orientations; support integration; solidarity; conjoint analysis Introduction In the aftermath euro crisis policy makers started discuss creation solidarity mechanisms level rationale is twofold: first these would ease adjustment in Economic Monetary Union (EMU) second they ensure pro- tection citizens crisis-struck countries Although governments remain divided idea that EMU needs an automatic mechanism risk sharing CONTACT kuhn@uva nl Supplemental accessed This Open Access distributed under terms Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer- ivatives License (http://creativecommons org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4 0/) which permits non-commercial re-use distri- bution reproduction any medium provided original work properly cited not altered transformed built upon way absorb shocks has been discussed both Commission (2017a 2017b) Council (Van Rompuy 2012) also increased political salience inte- gration public opinion become increasingly relevant factor legitimizing further integration (Hooghe Marks 2018) Hence it key understand what make plans establish insurance (EUI) how different design features contribute such policies paper focuses on individuals’ attitudes towards affect preferences alternative proposals EUI Exist- ing research yields mixed results showing (Kleider Stoeckel (Bechtel et al 2014; Kleider 2018; play impor- tant role structuring cross-border We argue European-level initiatives underlying notions cannot reduced single one-dimensional concept ‘social Europe’ ‘European solidarity’ entails (Baute Gallego Marx 2017) For instance includes various dimensions generosity conditionality scheme citizen likely depends expect influence impact ways show some are ‘domestic’ since mainly resonate with domestic debates hence relate more directly respondents whereas over other admin- istration ‘cross-border’ referring relation- ships between reflect citizens’ orientations conducted survey experiment involving 19 500 across 13 ask choose randomly assigned pairs packages varying six dimensions: (1) their (the minimum benefits secured support); (2) whether there conditions participating providing education training unemployed; (3) involves permanent between-country redistribu- tion; (4) taxation respondent’s country; (5) administered national governments; (6) attached individual unemployed aim important existing posals study differences consider generos- ity predominantly well-known contrast we redistribution administration refer relationships find only about 3% reject all forms unem- ployment while 6% lend unconditional general schemes fea- tures background characteristics Supporting our hypotheses dimension substantially traction depending point extent same direction but less straightforward have individual’s except apply programmes provide latter observation may explained fact left- right cleavage does out edu- cation plays gener- osity distinction clear-cut regard argued repeatedly next Banking Capital Market fiscal stabilizers (Franchino Segatti 2019) One option achieve re- benefit euro-zone (European 2017a organization re-insurance was rehearsed successive official reports subject matter academic (summarized focus happenstance Unemployment supports purchasing power recession therefore stabilizer par excellence Historically crucial building block development welfare states often established moments major (Rehm 2016) It unsurprising Great Recession triggered debate EMU-wide today’s assigning realm remains politically uphill battle Given resistance against ideas Sensitive issues concern among others member degree might emerge These dealt emphasis questions differentiates from studies EU-wide test predispositions share resources borders circumstances need relatively broad results: considerable (Ferrera Pellegata 2017; Gerhards come nuanced conclusions (Lahusen Grasso heavily domain review (Genschel Hemerijck empha- sizes self-interest notably individuals net benefici- aries contributors given employment status (Naumann profile income justice perceptions egalitarianism ‘deservingness’ Oorschot combine con- siderations scale measures respondents’ position control currently employed context evolving ideological realignment experienced western societies Teney 2014) examine specific affects varies people’s On one hand ‘old’ left still determinant interacting independently (Alesina La Ferarra 2005) actual While positioning partially endogenous shown possible dis- entangle two effects (Margalit 2013) closely aligned ideology: beyond evaluations differ views fairness equality state regulating market beliefs (Jaeger 2006) international (2018: 1) ‘voters’ fuller understanding conflict transfers’ prospect complicates things because touches ‘boundaries (Kuhn Kamm 2019): traditionally bound nation people disagree immigrants living abroad should (Pardos-Prado 2020) literature chauvinism shows many generally supportive time seek exclude its (Mewes Mau (2019) Spain do structure linked emerging divide opening closing globalization Zürn de Wilde Empirical expectations identity cosmopolitan atti- tudes significantly willingness bailout turn Franchino experiments Italy union conflicting multidimensional nature concepts multidimen- sionality salient case complex labour especially those multilevel settings multidimensionality rather than assessing Studies bailouts (Gallego sensitive changes along vary Most consequences pursued within potential (it sets floor benefits) supranational defines overall volume generated scheme) Or take another example comply legitimacy ‘insurance contract’ Notwithstanding complexity partition into ‘(mainly) domestic’ cross-border’ (Table sider dimen- sions ‘Domestic’ imply understood means own country attitude (expected be) Table 1 Dimensions levels Levels Characterization Expectation Generosity 40% Domestic 60% 70% Country-level No Education dimension* long-term Cross-border Long-term rich too poor Taxation increase 0 5% everyone 1% governance National Individual Accept job once week * bestowed community indi- vidual equally constitutes think intrinsic value (its beneficial effect) qua per se A if tude relations Admittedly always clear-cut; indicate respect activation arguably classified provides overview characterization groups interact differently speak plausible pro-Euro- pean eurosceptics moreover reasonable greater H.1.1. Citizens’ (between-country tion administration) strongly tie long-standing conflicts econ- omic influenced Individuals left-wing will redistributive character Similarly right-wing prefer generous conditional H.1.2. positions (generosity taxation) orientation embedded online states: Austria Belgium Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Ireland Poland models past performance geographical location zone membership Fieldwork company IPSOS took place October November 2018 Conjoint used analyse multidi- mensional 2019; Hobolt Rodon asked profiles representing Each series values Our introduced short information ensuring sustainable facing crises (appendix Figure itself 6 large ongoing (Vandenbroucke match conceivable variations allow analy- sis fundamental respondent evaluates three indicating rating each proposal individually evaluate total Both selection (i e combination dimensions) order completely randomized concerns percentage last wage ployed (or ‘replacement rate’) insured (40% 70%) captures include lower replacement rate framing clarify able higher so wish expenses words creates common country-level i must fulfil receive funding simple investment structured (‘no conditions’ ‘education training’) third cerns individual-level ditionality focusing job-search effort levels: ‘no ‘accept suitable offer lose benefit’ ‘apply least accept fourth refers involve no beneficiaries Three included (‘insurance option’) long run: capped contribution (‘tolerant paid necessary Finally (‘redis- tributive run (on purpose) fifth scheme: capture administrations body implement possible: impact’; ‘taxes income’ rich’ random sample drawn Quotas age gender regional distribution final follows population 2% discrepancy demographic category most deviating 4% Surveys were translated main languages restrict who passed attention check did give set inconsistent answer patterns exper- iment 3 analytical 93 612 observations Operationalization Dependent variables dependent (DVs): binary package choice ordered score individ- uals estimates stable model- ling robustness checks alter composition (including inattentive individuals) vari- (package score) esti- mation methods (OLS Logit Multilevel Mixed Effects) embedding model (using choice-pairings levels) Appendix 5e B1 (Full Interaction Model) 4 Independent measure construct composite indicator including elements divide: gov- ernment responsibility business regulation standardized items just enough together (Cronbach alpha 53) 3b wording indicators using 5 elements: identification importance well-being Europeans trust leaders quite well 77) statistics indicator’s Control account (standardized 9 ISCED-11 categories) household dummy variable being dummies specifications variability Results Split-sample approach 4a assessment imental dimensions; however detailed scope Instead split- ting subsamples cluster according look split samples explore causal effect (Leeper respon- dents opposite gauge Europe creating four Since significant left/right whose larger standard deviation above/ below mean 7 Testing split-sample steps step estimate subsample All (models 1–4 2) OLS estimator variable; robust errors clustered 8 Model respectively high low scores Thus obtain coefficients estimated (left-wing respondents) coefficient equal 347 ceteris paribus increases when shifts (respondents favour redistribution) 082 substantial difference variation examined exam- ined 2: clearly left/ sensitivity; cal- culating absolute coefficients; shift 1–2 265 calculation 3–4 based reveals inter- esting (pro-European (eurosceptics) 05: very systematically compare sensitivity measured clustering popu- lation above (0 265) much 05) Put differ- ently Sensitivity tested via Main Hypothesis testing pro-European anti-European C: abs D Coefficients omitted R2 08 07 06 05 N 968 11 724 14 364 Notes: Figures individual-robust SEs parenthesis p < 1; **p 05; ***p 01 Models columns models; grey shade: hypothesis confirmed; rejected confirms presents seventh column indicates ernance shade supported figures linear condition basis pro/anti-European With turns made (for H1 holds) everybody: (as compared change) interaction marginal 3) full-interaction actions EU-orien- tations allows us intensity polarization Further- full assess evolve simultaneously; reach splitting Again consistent number 6; details see footnote action panels reproduce predicted scales (from −3 – wing anti-EU) (left pro-EU) align result analysis; relative size average equivalent additional insight (panels As place- ment approaches extreme 3: (scale) int eraction (left- scale) (EU Left-right polity 036 (1 70)* 099 (5 22)*** n/a (base level) 217 163 014 (23 72)*** (10 78)*** 06) 277 261 020 (28 69)*** (16 59)*** 4) 155 002 037 Pure (20 97)*** 18) (3 45)*** From 019 (2 11)** 024 64)*** 045 10)*** 080 51)*** 059 (4 49)*** 069 31)*** −0 136 (15 20)*** 067 032 23)** 026 97)** 006 (7 52)*** 47)*** 43) 058 46) 148 (12 65)*** 168 96)*** 292 (18 02)*** 079 Low 144 (14 26)*** 054 336 8)*** 44)*** Logged 039 93)*** Currently 28)** Age 010 66)* Female 11) Constant 273 (30 78270 individual- T-statistics par- entheses *p First country-fixed However characterized holds prefer- ences ‘tolerant’ cross-country Marginal black light When constrained pro-Eur- opeans supporting anti- opposing suggests concerning genuine activate sensibilities polarize yet new sum confirm exceptions: EU; Conclusion poorly under- stood An fills lacuna exploring dents’ designs start particular constructs Therefore gather conforms expected them personally better deploy modelling surveyed expressing dom- estic search effort; presence (ranging right) associated associ- ated although originally envisaged determining support; moderates versus expectation rejected: turned moderated instead sources favouring tend (Hakhverdian country- Second world view motivates aspect speaks –in posi- tive sense Either far placement insufficient evidence slightly slope steeper statistically highest yielded scales: pro-Europeans anti-Europeans oppose finding resonates recent finds high-income weak negative assess- issue voting candidate’s Brexit voters Some limitations invite caution interpreting maintain simplicity avoid cognitive biases here sub-sample scheme; (not experiment) even variance limited (r-square rarely 8%) suggesting phenomena (possibly macro-level) lacking small (13) limits regard: future dataset macro-level immerged post-stratification weights correct minor deviations targeted quotas practice introduction tailored perceived weaker unlikely without part ‘grand bargain’ tighter strengthened macro- coordination negotiating exchanges impossible net-contributor underestimated net-recipient could over-estimated notwithstanding coexist ideologies Notes 1. following exception: presented fol- lowing 2. Belgian French Dutch; Spanish region Catalonia offered Catalan; Estonians Estonian Russian 3. 12% gave B whilst expresses B) alternatives; 4. baseline (model Score exclud- controls 5a respondents; 5b excludes 5c fear becoming preference migration servative reproduced Choice 5d 5f) embeddings (5g 5h) Annex available request 5. Household log middle decile belongs (income after tax compulsory deductions sources) 6. 4b analyses They largely 7. cases 8. 4c report logit (also ual-variable appendix 4b) Acknowledgements thank Brian Burgoon Sara Sergi Pardos Toni participants workshop ‘Domestic contestation Union’ London School Econ- omics December anonymous reviewers helpful comments Sven Hegewald David van der Duin excellent assistance usual disclaimers Disclosure statement interest reported authors Funding KU Leuven (Belgium) Istituto Nazionale l’Ana- lisi delle Politiche Pubbliche (INAPP Italy) acknowledges Dutch (grant nr 451-13-029) Associate Professor science Assistant Ghent affiliated ORCID http://orcid org/0000-0001-8784-1731 References Alesina Ferrara E (2005) ‘Preferences land oppor- tunities’ Economics 89(5-6): 897–931 Baute S Meuleman Abts K Swyngedouw M (2018) ‘Measuring Europe: approach’ Indicators 137(1): 353–378 Bechtel Hainmueller J Margalit Y (2014) redistribution: eurozone bailouts’ American 58(4): 835–856 (2017a) ‘Reflection deepening monetary union’ COM(2017) 291 31 May Brussels: avail- https://ec europa eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper- emu_en pdf (accessed July (2017b) ‘Communication Parliament Central Bank New budgetary instruments Euro area framework’ COM (2017) 8222 Final eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/com_822_0 Ferrera ‘Can reconciled? REScEU Working Paper Series Milan: Milan February 2017 centroeinaudi it/images/ locandine/REScEU_Mass_survey_results_SHORT_VERSION F P ‘Public Eurozone union: evi- dence Italy’ 26(1): 126–148 ‘Multi-dimensional reforms: experiment’ 24(7): 1027– 1047 Genschel ‘Solidarity Brief Transnational 2018/01 Florence: https://cadmus eui eu/bitstream/handle/1814/53967/STG_PB_2018_01 pdf? sequence=4&isAllowed=y Lengfeld H Ignácz Z Kley Priem ‘How strong solidarity?’ BSSE 37 Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin polsoz fu-berlin de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makros oziologie/arbeitspapiere/bsse_37 html Hakhverdian Van Elsas Brug W T (2013) ‘Euroscepticism education: longitudinal 12 1973–2010’ Politics 14(4): 522–541 ‘Cross-cutting electoral choice: Brexit’ doi:10 1080/ 13501763 1701535 Hooghe L G ‘Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset Rokkan transnational cleavage’ 25(1): 109–135 Jaeger (2006) ‘What makes vision: ideology? Acta Sociologica 49(3): 321–338 ‘The politics Explaining transfers EU’ 58 (1): 1–26 boundaries solidarity: Review 11(2): 179–195 Solaz ‘Practising you preach: cosmopo- litanism promotes redistribute 25(12): 1759–1778 Lahusen C comparative discussion’ (eds) Solidarity Responses Times Crisis Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan pp 253–281 Leeper Tilley subgroup experiments’ Analysis 1017/pan ‘Explaining preferences: great reces- sion’ 107(1): 80–103 Mewes ‘Globalization socio-economic chau- vinism: perspectives toward exclusion immigrants’ International Comparative Sociology 54(3): 228–245 Naumann Buss Bähr (2016) experience state: real panel Sociological 32(1): 81–92 Pardos-Prado ‘Labour deregulation immigration radical voting’ 1701536 Rehm Risk Inequality Welfare States Development Dynamics Cambridge: Cambridge Press ‘Mobilizing costly policies: party cues JCMS: Common 56(2): 446–461 Lacewell O De ‘Winners losers ideologies’ 6(4): 575–595 Sacchi ‘Risk hits: How influ- (EURS)’ AISSR Report Amsterdam: https://aissr uva nl/content/news/2018/12/eurs Roosma Reeskens Legitimacy Targeted Attitudes Deservingness Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2012) ‘Towards President Herman ‘Debating globalization: cosmopolitanism commu- nitarianism Ideologies 21(3): 280–301

en_GB
nl_NL